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Abstract 
The disputed territorial claims in the South China Sea remain a dangerous 
source of potential conflict in the absence of preventive measures to forestall a 
military or political crisis. Three periods of heightened tension over the Spratly 
Islands within the past ten years offer a clear warning sign of the risk of future 
confrontation if the core issues remain unresolved. It is in the interest of all the 
claimants to actively seek solutions to the disputes through negotiations to avoid 
future military conflict. All the claimants have an interest in participating in a 
preventive diplomatic approach to the South China Sea. 
Preventive diplomacy has reached the top of the agenda in the discourse 
on multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. It is at the stage 
where the first measures are being implemented by the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), the centrepiece of official security dialogue in the region, but the obstacles 
to progress remain formidable. Preventive Diplomacy is a natural follow-up of 
confidence building, to develop a set of guidelines for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes. 
A range of preventive diplomatic mechanisms and approaches might be 
used to dampen tensions, forestall the outbreak of conflict in the South China Sea, 
and provide the basis for a settlement. The South China Sea Informal Working 
Group encourages confidence among South China Sea states through Track Two 
Diplomacy and also have provided important opportunities for cooperative action 
on technical issues. In the future, an effort might be made to upgrade these 
informal meetings to address such questions as sovereignty or mechanisms for 
joint exploration of resources. 
Word Count excluding footnotes; 15,667 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The South China Sea's significance has been recently highlighted 
throughout the Asia-Pacific region, not just for its strategically important 
commercial and military sea-lanes. But, also for furnishing living and mineral 
resources to the littoral states. As a consequence, over the past two decades 
competing claims to island territories, maritime and seabed jurisdictions, and 
access to fisheries have cast governments into a tangled nexus of regional 
jurisdictional conflicts and rivalries. 
Especially, East Asia's economic growth rates had been among the highest 
in the world. Despite, the current economic crisis, economic growth prospects in 
the long-term remain among the best in the world. This economic growth will be 
accompanied by an increasing demand for energy. Over the next 20 years, oil 
consumption among developing Asian countries is expected to rise by 4% 
annually on average, with about half of this increase coming from China.' If this 
growth rate is maintained, oil demand for these nations will reach 25 million 
barrels per day - more than double current consumption levels by 2020. 
The matter of maritime boundary delimitation in the South China Sea is 
especially problematic, primarily because the present situation is defined in terms 
of a configuration of overlapping unilateral claims to sovereignty over an 
assortment of various semi-submerged natural formations scattered throughout the 
region. These hundreds of islands, islets, cays, reefs, rocks, shoals, and banks 
comprise four main archipelagoes in the South China Sea: the Pratas, 
Macclesfield Bank, Paracels, and Spratlys.2 
1 ICE Case "Studies Spratly Islands dispute" (Publications) (May 1997) 21 
<http://www.arnerican.edu/projects/mandala/TED / ice/spratly.htm> (last accessed 24 
August 2002). 
2 Federation of American Scientists the Spratly Islands, Military Analysis Network. 
<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/spratly.htm> (last accessed 30 July 
2002). 
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It may still be possible to find a political, "win-win" settlement. If the 
political will can be generated to reach a negotiated settlement, there is a window 
of opportunity to pursue progress. Military conflict would threaten the interests of 
all parties to the dispute, since the political costs of military escalation would be 
higher than any single party is currently willing to bear. No country in the region 
currently possesses the military capabilities needed to assert and maintain its 
claims. Relations in the region are generally cooperative and no claimant has yet 
discovered commercially viable quantities of oil or natural gas.
3 However, all 
these factors are subject to change, especially as China and other claimants, 
acquire the military strength to impose their claims by threat or use of military 
force. 
Given the nature and complexity of the various legal claims to the islands 
and concerns about the regional balance of power, no purely legal process is likely 
to be sufficient to achieve a settlement. Although the establishment and 
acceptance of international legal precedents, such as those contained in the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, may provide a necessary foundation for the 
negotiation of key issues. 
The situation highlights the need for sensible solutions to ease tensions 
between several countries that claim all or portions of the Spratlys group. This 
paper aims to view confidence-building measures (CBMs), focusing on the 
territorial dispute. A variety of supplementary approaches to the Indonesian 
workshops through track two diplomacy could be considered. For example, 
creation of an Eminent Persons Group, possibly composed of high-level 
representatives from the non-claimant members of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), has been suggested to jump-start political talks and 
create new political channels for negotiation. 
Another possibility is mediation by an ad hoe tribunal or non-official third 
party if the claimants themselves are willing to accept such a negotiation process 
3 Federation of American Scientists, Above. 
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to facilitate resolution of territorial claims. If the parties can agree to an equitable 
approach by which to shelve sovereignty issues, it may be possible to create joint 
multilateral development authority to exploit resources in the disputed area. 
Alternatively, recent developments suggest that it might be possible to settle 
bilateral claims in the South China Sea area before tackling areas in which 
multiple claims overlap. 
The critical question, however, is whether the disputants can find the 
political will to come to a lasting negotiated settlement. The purpose in this paper 
is to study how the conflict management process in the South China Sea (SCS) 
has been conducted in order to see which strategies have proved to be most 
successful in reaching a solution or in decreasing the intensity of the conflict and 
why. To do this, I have chosen to look into the different management styles that 
have been used in Asia, the so called The ASEAN Way, also referred to as the 
informal style and the formal management style that is proposed by the West.4 
4 Niklas Swanstrom & Ramses Amer Conflicts and Cooperation in Pacific Asia (International 
Studies No. 3, U.I. Stockholm, autunm 1996), 52. 
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II. ASEAN AND PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY 
A. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
1. Overview 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN was established 
on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok by the five original Member Countries, namely, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam 
joined on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Laos and Myanmar on 23 
July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999.5 
[T]oday, ASEAN 1s not only a well-functioning, 
indispensable reality in the region. It is a real force to be reckoned 
with far beyond the region. It is also a trusted partner of the United 
Nations in the field of development.6 
The Bangkok Declaration states that the aims and purposes of the ASEAN 
are: 7 
1. to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development 
in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and 
partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and 
peaceful community of Southeast Asian nations; 
11. to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice 
and the rule of law in the relationship among countries in the region and 
adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter. 
Although the Bangkok Declaration did not mention political cooperation, 
it already contained important political principles regarding the members' 
responsibility for regional stability and security. 
5 ASEAN-Japan. Centre ASEAN Overview 
<http://www.asean.or.jp/ eng/ general/ base/ overview.html> (last accessed 24 August 
2002). 
6 Kofi Annan 'UnihJ in DiversihJ, Indonesia's 111otto, Sums up 'Our Co111111on Hu111anihj', Says 
Secretary-General in Jakarta Address (Press Release SG/SM/7303, 16 February 2000). 
7 ASEAN-Japan. Centre, Above. 
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The first such joint political action was the Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration, signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27 November 
1971, during an extra-ordinary meeting of the foreign ministers. The ZOPF AN 
Declaration reiterated the members' commitment to the principles contained in the 
Bangkok Declaration, that the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary 
responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability in the region. 
It was only a matter of time before ASEAN's regular interaction on 
economic cooperation with states and multilateral agencies outside Southeast Asia 
would evolve to include other concerns-primarily regional security. At the 1992 
Singapore Summit, the ASEAN leaders declared that "ASEAN shall move 
towards a higher plane of political and economic cooperation to secure regional 
peace and prosperity."8 
The end of the Cold War had altered the configuration of international 
relations in East Asia. The new environment presented historic opportunities for 
the relaxation of tensions in the region through multilateral consultations, 
confidence building, and eventually the prevention of conflict. In 1994, the ARF 
was established as a major venue for carrying out ASEAN's objectives ofregional 
harmony and stability. The ARF is the first region-wide consultative body in Asia 
focused on security issues.9 The current participants in the ARF are as follows: 
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
European Union, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New 
Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, 
Thailand, United States, Vietnam. 10 
8ASEAN-Japan. Centre, Above. 
9 ASEAN Secretariat The Eighth ASEAN Regiollnl Forulll 2000-2001: ASEAN Regional Fonmz 
(ARF) Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy (ASEC, Jakarta, 2001). 
10 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade ARF (A SEAN Regional Forum) 
(Australia, 2000) <.http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/arf isg.hbnl> (last accessed 24 August 
2002). 
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ARF adopted two main objectives. First, to foster constructive dialogue 
and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern. 
Secondly, to contribute to efforts towards confidence building and preventive 
diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. 11 At the Twenty-seventh ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting in 1994, the Foreign Ministers agreed that ARP could become 
an effective consultative Asia-Pacific Forum for promoting open dialogue on 
political and security cooperation in the region. In this context, ASEAN should 
work with its ARF partners to bring about a more predictable and constructive 
pattern of relations in the Asia Pacific region. 12 
Since July 1994, ARP has taken an evolutionary approach extended over 
three broad stages, which are, the promotion of confidence building among 
participants, the development of preventive diplomacy and the elaboration of 
approaches to conflicts. 13 This approach enables ARP participants to deal 
constructively with political and security issues that bear on regional peace and 
stability. This approach also includes new issues that have emerged as a result of 
globalisation, such as, territorial and jurisdictional disputes in the South China 
Sea. Like many other parts of the world, Southeast Asia faces territorial disputes 
among its members and nearby states. In these disputes ASEAN has consistently 
pursued a policy of cooperation in seeking the peaceful settlement of differences. 
2. The ASEAN "Way". 
ASEAN is in a sense a mature organisation. In 2002, it celebrated 35 
years, since its establishment. It has evolved into an effective organisation and 
experienced a process of The ASEAN Way. Dato' Dr. Noordin Sopiee, Head of the 
Malaysian Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS Malaysia) has 
proposed that The ASEAN Way has 12 basic core principles. These core 
. . 1 14 pnnc1p es are : 
11 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Above. 
12 Australian Deparbnent of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Above. 
13 Australian Deparbnent of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Above. 
14 To list them, not necessarily in order of their importance. 
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1. Cooperative Peace. 
2. Seeking Agreement and Harmony. 
3. Respect for Territorial Integrity. 
4. Non-Interference in the Domestic Affairs of Member States. 
5. Egalitarianism. 
6. Decisions-making by Consensus. 
7. Sensitivity, Politeness, Non-Confrontation and Agreeability. 
8. Mutual Caring. 
9. Quiet, Private, and Elitist Diplomacy versus Public Washing of Dirty Linen 
and Diplomacy trough the Media. 
10. Solidarity. 
11. Being Non-Cartesian, Non-Legalistic and concentrating on Process and 
Content. 
12. Pragmatism. 
Each of these principles may not be unique to ASEAN, but perhaps it is the 
combination of all these principles, which makes ASEAN what it is. These 
principles are not stated in ASEAN official documents and have not been 
formalised. 
The ASEAN way has been criticized for being ineffective. A political demand 
for an increase in the formality and open criticism and break with the non-
interventionist rule inside the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
developed. The debate is, between the Western belief that formal and multilateral 
management is the way to reach a successful resolution of a conflict and the Asian 
strategy that informal and bilateral management is more successful.
15 Human 
Rights activists have criticized this fonn of management, especially since Burma 
joined ASEAN and is now protected by the ASEAN way. 
Critics have questioned whether this type of a rather loosely structured 
organisation is the way of the future. Former Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali 
15 Peter King & Yoichi Kibata Peace Building in the Asia Pacific Region (Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards, 1996). 
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Alatas, defined ASEAN as an organisation with a secretariat and a codified set of 
rules and procedures that has developed in a gradual way. 16 He suggested that 
APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) might want to learn from ASEAN's 
· 17 expenence. 
The ASEAN way supported the decision-making by consensus principle, 
providing reassurance to the weakest member that unwanted policies would not be 
imposed on it. To resolve any differences between members, ASEAN relied more 
on close personal ties at high-ranking officials rather than formal institutions and 
treaties. Ministers and head of governments, often-cemented agreements on the 
golf course or at post meeting entertainment sessions. 18 This facilitated the 
resolution of differences among the elite, reducing the need to resort to various 
forms of pressure for achieving national goals. 
B. Preventive Diplomacy 
In January 1992, the first-ever meeting of heads of state and government 
of the UN Security Council concluded with a request from the council for 
"analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more 
efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the 
United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peace making and for peace-
keeping". 19 
In order to respond to this request, the Secretary-General, Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali presented a report "Agenda for Peace" with a chapter focusing on 
preventive diplomacy. This report received positive endorsements from the UN 
General Assembly in October 1992. High-level US officials have been among the 
most vocal supporters of preventive measures. Addressing the UN General 
16 Hadi Soesanto A SEAN in a Changed Regional and Internationa!Po!itica!Economy (Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 1995), l. 
17 Hadi Soesanto, Above. 
18 Hadi Soesanto, Above. 
19 Boutros-Ghali Boutros An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-
keeping (United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 1995), 5. 
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Assembly in 1992, President Bush stated that monitoring and preventive 
peacekeeping, putting people on the ground before the fighting starts, may 
become especially critical in hostile regions. 20 
The pnmary instruments containing a mandate applicable for conflict 
prevention are contained in the UN Charter, essentially in articles 1, 11(2), 24, 
Chapter VI and VII article 40 and especially 41, as well as in article 99.21 Article 
1 stipulates that the purposes of the United Nations are: 22 
[T]o maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to 
take effective collective measures for the prevention and the removal 
of threats to the peace, and for the suspression of acts of aggression 
or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, 
and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, 
adjustments or settlement of international disputes or situations 
which might lead to a breach of the peace. 
It is evidently better to prevent conflicts through early warnmg, quiet 
diplomacy and in some cases, preventive deployment than to have to undertake 
major politico-military efforts to resolve them after they have broken out.
23 
However, the most difficult aspect of conflict prevention is to know what 
approaches should be applied, with which actors and when exactly those 
approaches should be applied. 
The United Nations has defined term for preventive diplomacy as "an 
action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, prevent existing disputes 
from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they 
20 Michael S Lund. Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strnteg,; for Preventive Diplo111ncy (United 
States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1996), 5. 
21 Werner Bauwens and Luc Reychler The Art of Co11.flict Prevention: The United Nation in 
Conflict Preve11tion (Brassey's, London and New York, 1994), 28. 
22 See the UN Charter article 1 
23 Boutros, Above, 13. 
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occur."24 The Secretary-General may perform preventive diplomacy personally or 
through senior staff or specialised agencies and programs. Preventive diplomacy 
may also be conducted by the Security Council or the General Assembly, and by 
regional organisations in cooperation with the United Nations.25 
Preventive diplomacy requires measures to create mutual confidence and 
good faith that are essential to reducing the likelihood of conflict between States, 
known as Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). CBMs work to eliminate the 
elements of secrecy in military activity in order to help states distinguish between 
real and unfounded fears about the intent of or threat posed by a real or potential 
adversary. Examples of CBMs includes, systematic exchange of military 
m1ss10ns, formation of regional or subregional risk reduction centres, 
arrangements for the free flow of information, including the monitoring of 
. l 26 reg10na arms agreements. 
The term preventive diplomacy suggests different things to different 
people. As to date, practitioners and scholars have not agreed on the meaning. To 
some, it conjures up efforts by high level officials such as UN Secretary-General 
or U.S. Secretary of State, to contain an erupting international crisis or stop a war. 
To others, it suggests unofficial, track-two diplomacy or informal contacts and 
dialogue among disputing parties, often conducted behind the scenes by NGOs. 
Some consider the word diplomacy to refer only to peaceful methods of 
discussion, such as negotiation and bargaining. However, others do not exclude 
the use of armed forces or other forms of coercion as a method for preventive 
d. l 21 1p omacy. 
24 Boutros, Above, 45. 
25 Boutros, Above, 46-47. 
26Boutros-Ghali Boutros An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and 
peacekeeping (United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 1995), 47. 
27Michael S Lund. Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (United 
States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1996), 31. 
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Since preventive diplomacy does not specify what is to be prevented, some 
assume it deals primarily or solely with wars - that is open, armed hostilities by 
two or more antagonists. However, others believe it also should address one-sided 
conflicts such as genocide, the repression of human rights and humanitarian 
disaster such as a massive exodus of refugees. Some associate the term with the 
amelioration of basic conditions that can breed violence, such as poverty, 
overpopulation and ignorance. According to Lund, as preventive diplomacy has 
come into vogue recently, it has been waved like a banner over almost any attempt 
to remedy one or another post-Cold War problem.28 
While the nature and intensity of tensions and conflicts vary from region 
to region, no area is free of these potential threats to peace and security. Since the 
early 1990s, other such preventive procedures have been formulated , adopted, and 
employed by the Associations of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through its 
Regional Forum, ARF.29 
The great variety of actors, strains and conflicts has prompted the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) to provide the region with an institution to absorb 
multilateral dialogues on security.30 ARF develops further the concepts of 
confidence building, preventive diplomacy and finding ways to resolve regional 
tensions and conflicts. It also marks towards developing instruments for conflict 
resolution in the region. 
The definition, concept and principles of preventive diplomacy as agreed 
by the ARF members are not legal obligations.31 They are shared perspectives that 
would apply only to the ARF and should be understood as representing the current 
28 Lund, Above. 
29 Lund, Above, 7. 
30 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade A RF (ASEAN Regional Fomm) 
Report on the First 1999-2000 Meeting of the ARP ISG on CBMs 
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/arf isg.hhnl> (last accessed 24 August 2002). 
31 ASEANWeb Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy para 2 Seventh ARP 
Ministerial Meeting 27 July 2000 Bangkok Thailand 
<http://www.aseansec.org/golek.hhnl> (last accessed 10 April 2002). 
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status of an evolving consensus in the ARF. These perspectives should be aimed 
at enhancing mutual understanding and trust among ARF members, taking into 
account the actual conditions of the region and be consistent with basic principles 
of international law and established ARF processes. 32 
The ARF definition of preventive diplomacy is broad. However, there 
appears to be general consensus that preventive diplomacy is consensual, 
diplomatic and political action taken by sovereign states with the consent of all 
directly involved parties: 33 
• To help prevent disputes and conflicts from arising between States that could 
potentially pose a threat to regional peace and stability: 
• To help prevent such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed 
confrontation; and 
• To help minimise the impact of such disputes and conflicts on the region. 
Preventive diplomacy measures within the ARF could include the following: 34 
a) Confidence Building Efforts i.e. efforts to build mutual trust and confidence 
between states. The successful application of preventive diplomacy has to be 
built upon continuous efforts to maintain and enhance trust and confidence. 
Without a high degree of trust among ARF participants, it is unlikely that 
Preventive diplomacy in the later stages of any conflict can be carried out. 
While the ARF has succeeded in fostering dialogue among ARF members 
over the past few years, it is now timed to look into strengthening the habit of 
cooperation. Cooperation among ARF members can preempt disputes as well 
as prevent disputes from developing into conflicts by enhancing trust and 
understanding. 
b) Norm building i.e. nurturing of accepted codes or norms of behaviour guiding 
the relationships among states in the Asia-Pacific region. To the extent that the 
codes enhance predictability and strengthen cooperative behaviour in ensuring 
regional peace, norm building enhances trust between and among states in the 
32Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Above. 
33 ASEANWeb, Above. 
34 ASEANWeb, Above. 
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region. The ARF could consider measures in this area, such as developing a 
code of conduct governing relations among ARF members which is consistent 
with existing codes such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia (TAC) and the UN Charter. 
c) Enhancing Channels of Communication; open, easy and direct 
communications or channels among ARF participants, which serve to promote 
transparency with a view to, avoid misperception or misunderstanding. Such 
channels would advance information sharing, provide early warning and 
facilitate dialogue. 
d) Role of the ARF Chair. The ARF Chair could play a diplomatic role using 
peaceful methods as determined by ARF members, such as negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, and conciliation. 
From this broad definition of Preventive diplomacy, we can view Preventive 
diplomacy along a time-line in keeping with the objectives to prevent disputes and 
conflicts between states from emerging and escalating into armed confrontation, 
also to prevent such disputes and conflicts from spreading. Some measures could 
be taken even before a crisis has actually arisen. 
CBMs are ideal tools for the 21st century, a time in which promising trends 
and troubling developments coexist uneasily in many parts of the world. Under 
these confusing circumstances, political leaders can employ CBMs to accentuate 
the positive and guard against the negative. Communication, constraint, 
transparency, and verification measures are the primary CBM "tools." These tools 
are designed to make the behaviour of states more predictable by facilitating 
communication among states and establishing rules or patterns of behaviour for 
states' military forces, as well as the means to discern and verify compliance with 
those patterns. 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been preventing 
disputes from arising for the last thirty years through preventive diplomacy.35 
35 Hasjim Djalal and Ian Townsend-Gault Preventive Diplomacy: Managing potential 
Conflicts in the South China Sea (United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 108. 
Whenever disputes anse, they have been handled in the so-called The ASEAN 
way. This method of preventing disputes from escalating is characterized as 
Seeking agreement and harmony through dialogue and decisions making by 
consensus among parties involved in the disputes. This method is aimed to de-
escalate conflict by reducing anger, fear, and tension and improve communication 
and mutual understanding. 36 
Preventive diplomacy adopted the principles of ASEAN way to maintain 
peace and stability in the Southeast Asia region. This can be illustrated by 
developments over the past decade in Indochina, the South China Sea and the 
Southern Philippines. While the situation in the Southern Philippines has been 
regarded primarily as an internal matter, it has also caught the attention of the 
Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). 37 Indonesia was invited and has been 
able to play a significant role as a mediator in the Southern Philippines based on 
Non-Interference in the Domestic Affairs of the ASEAN way principles. 
In Indochina, ASEAN devoted more than ten years to prevent existing 
disputes from escalating into conflicts. 38 ASEAN dealt with a succession of 
issues, beginning with Vietnam's intervention to topple the Khmers Rouges 
regime in Cambodia in 1979 and then contributing to the Paris Peace Accords, 
which paved the way for elections. In the South China Sea, the informal 
Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts have formulated various cooperative 
efforts to convert the potential conflicts into actual areas of cooperation. 
36 John W. McDonald Further Exploration of Trnck Two Diplomacy in Timing the De-
Escalation of Intemational Conflicts (Syracuse NY, Syracuse University Press, 1991), 201. 
<http: //www.colorado.edu/ conflict/peace/ example/ mcdo3682.htm> (last accessed 26 
August 2002). 
37 Moro National Liberation Front Home Page 
<http:/ /mnlf.net/OIC/25th_ICFM_Resolution.htm> (last Accessed 20 August 2002). 
38 Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation 
<http:/ /www.mfaic.gov.kh/Region/ ASEAN/> (last accessed 20 August 2002). 
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III. TERRITORIAL DISPUTE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
A. Nature and Status 
The South China Sea region is the world's second busiest international sea-
lane. 39 More than half of the world's supertanker traffic passes through the 
region's waters. Freedom of navigation through the South China Sea, particularly 
through the choke points of the Taiwan Strait in the north and the Straits of 
Malacca in the south, remains essential to the region's geostrategic role in linking 
northeast Asia's seaborne trade with the rest of the world. 
Safety of navigation and overflight and the freedom of sea-lanes of 
communication are critical for the strategic interests of many countries. The 
United States uses the South China Sea as a transit point and operating area for 
the U.S. Navy and Air Force between military bases in Asia, the Indian Ocean and 
the Persian Gulf areas.40 Any military conflict in the South China Sea that 
threatens the strategic interests of the United States or the security and economic 
interests of Japan, might be seen as sufficiently destabilizing to invite U.S. 
involvement to preserve navigational freedom in these critical sea lanes. 
Claims over territory's sovereignty in the South China Sea are based on 
acts of discovery, occupation and certain inferred rights over continental shelf 
delimitation. The South China Sea, covering an area of 800,000 square kilometers 
(310,000 square miles) is semi-enclosed, with ninety percent of its circumference 
rimmed by land. Many of Asia's most influential states are among its littoral 
countries: the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand; 
39 Federation of American Scientists The Spratly Islands Military Analysis Network, 
<http://www.fas.org/man/ dod-101/ ops/war/spratly.htm> (last accessed 30 July 2002). 
40 ICE Case "Studies Spratly Islands dispute" (May 1997) 21 
<http://www.american.edu/ projects/mandala/TED /ice/spratly.hbn> (last accessed 24 
August 2002). 
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the Indochinese countries of Cambodia and Vietnam; and the People's Republic of 
China (PRC, or China) and Taiwan (the Republic of China).41 
Eight states claim title to these South China Sea islands. Singapore and 
Malaysia dispute claims over Pisang Island and Pulau Batu Puteh, strategically 
situated in the congested waters of Malacca and Singapore Straits.42 China, 
Taiwan, and Vietnam contest each other's claims to sovereignty over the Paracel 
Islands, a group of fifteen islets and several reefs and shoals scattered over a 200-
kilometer area in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin. 43 In January 197 4, military 
hostilities broke out between China and the Republic of Vietnam over the 
Paracels, ending in a Chinese victory and that government's forceful consolidation 
of the entire atoll.44 Taiwan also contests China's claims to Pratas Island and the 
Macclesfield Bank. As for the Spratlys, six states assert claims: China, Taiwan 
and Vietnam claim the entire archipelago, while the Philippines, Malaysia and 
Brunei claim sovereignty over portions of the Spratlys. Except for Brunei, all the 
others have established a military presence in the Spratlys.45 
The Spratly Island group, geographically located between 4°and 11 ° 3' 
North Latitude and 109°30' and 117° 50' East Longitude, contains some 100-230 
scattered islands, isles, shoals, banks, atolls, cays, and reefs.46 With elevations 
ranging from two to six meters, the mapped islands of the Spratly archipelago, 
including shallow territorial waters, cover an area of approximately 180,000 
41 J. R. Morgan and M. J. Valencia Atlas for Marine Policy in South-East Asian Seas 
(University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983), 3-4. 
42 D.M. Johnston and M.J. Valencia Pacific Ocean Boundan; Problems: Status and Solutions 
(Martinus Nijhoff, Boston, 1991), 128. 
43 The-Khang Chang "China's Claim of Sovereignty Over the Spratly and Paracel Islands: 
A Historical and Legal Perspective" (1991) 23 CWRJIL 399,399. 
44 Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea (Methuen, New York, 1982), 98. 
45 Mark J. Valencia South-East Asian Seas, Oil under Troubled Waters:Hydrocnrboll Potential, 
Jurisdictional Issues and International Relations (Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1985), 
87. 
46 ICE Cases, Above. 
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square kilometers (69,500 square miles).47 The Spratlys are too small and barren 
to support permanent human settlement independently, and few have fresh water 
or any significant land-based resources. 48 
B. Territorial Dispute and Overlapping Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction 
The "potential conflicts" in the South China Sea arise from a complex 
series of overlapping or multiple claims to the islets and rocks with which the 
southern part of that sea is strewn, and also to jurisdiction in the sea areas around 
these features. 49 The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea created a number of 
guidelines concerning the status of islands, the continental shelf, enclosed seas, 
and territorial limits. Three of the most relevant to the South China Sea are: 50 
a) Article 3, which establishes that "every state has the right to establish the 
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles"; 
b) Articles 55 - 75 define the concept of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 
which is an area up to 200 nautical miles beyond and adjacent to the territorial 
sea. The EEZ gives coastal states "sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, 
whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to" (above) "the seabed 
and of the seabed and its subsoil..." 
c) Article 121 states that rock, which cannot sustain human habitation or 
economic life of their own, shall have no exclusive economic zone or 
continental shelf. 
The establishment of the EEZ created the potential for overlapping claims in 
semi-enclosed seas such as the South China Sea. An ocean region legally 
47 Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke, and Noel A. Ludwig Sharing the Resources of the 
South China Sen (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1997), 225. 
48 Tao Cheng "The Dispute Over the South China Sea Islands" (1975) 10 TILJ 267, 267. 
49 Hasjim Djalal and Ian Townsend-Gault Preventive Diplomacy: Managing potential 
Conflicts in the South China Sea (United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 108. 
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comprised of high seas and international seabed would be rendered into a semi-
enclosed sea. 51 These claims could be extended by any nation, which could 
establish a settlement on the islands in the region. South China Sea claimants have 
clashed as they tried to establish outposts on the islands (mostly military) in order 
to be in conformity with Article 121 in pressing their claims. 
Article 56 of the treaty outlines parameters for the establishment of a country's 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which extends 200 nautical miles from the 
country's coastline. Article 56 gives sovereign rights for exploration, exploitation, 
conservation, and resource management of living and non-living natural resources 
of waters in the country's EEZ. The UNCLOS further attempts to exclude rocks 
incapable of sustaining human habitation. The problem, however, stems from the 
country's right to define the natural feature as a rock or an island. 
Aside from defining an EEZ, the UNCLOS also contains parameters for a 
country's continental shelf in article 77. The continental shelf is defined as the 
underwater portion of the country's coastal landmass, including the seabed as well 
as the subsoil of the shelf. The deep ocean floor, however, is not considered part 
of a country's continental shelf. 
The third important part of the UN CLOS is Part VI, which justifies claims by 
Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines. Justification is based on proximity, not 
history; hence, China and Taiwan's historical claims would not likely win 
arbitrated cases. In May of 1996, China's parliament passed a resolution to 
approve the Law of the Sea UN Convention. Signing onto the Convention would 
enable China to extend its exclusive economic sea zone to 340 km. 
C. Significance of the South China Sea 
The maritime strategy of the PRC navy m the South China Sea has 
traditionally been guided by three principal missions: (1) to guard against Russian 
51 Choon-Ho Park "The South China Sea Disputes: Who Owns the Islands and the 
Natural Resources?" (1973) 37 ODIL 1, 1. 
invasion; (2) to counter nuclear attacks from sea-based sources; and (3) to protect 
sea lines of communication and Chinese claims to natural resources contiguous to 
archipelagoes in the Asia- Pacific region. As the Cold War has passed into history 
during the 1990s, the priority of these missions has shifted, with increasing 
importance now being placed on ensuring access to sea lanes and natural 
resources in the region. 
In order to maintain in the South China Sea, China's navy must optimize 
its available to have military influence over Malaysia, Singapore and the 
Philippines. China has no aircraft carriers and only limited in-flight refueling 
capabilities. 52 The acquisition of an aircraft carrier, estimated by the year 2010 
and improvement of in-flight refueling capacity, however, could make securing 
this combat radius possible.53 
China extends its influence as a maritime power in Asia. The Chinese are 
developing a blue-water navy, especially longer-range aircraft and submarine 
strength. 54 The Chinese desire to preserve economic and political interests through 
a strategic doctrine of active defence offshore. This has made the Chinese navy to 
be prepared for maritime disputes to defend the claims of sovereign rights, fishing 
rights, and the perceived potential of offshore hydrocarbon resources in the South 
China Sea. 
Developments affecting the Spratlys over the past decade have suggested 
that a regional arms build up might increase tensions in the South China Sea.55 
Not surprisingly, interstate regional relations became strained in the process. The 
first clash occurred on 8 February 1987, when Chinese and Vietnamese warships 
opened fire on each other in the area. On 14 March, a more serious confrontation 
52 William J. Dobson and M. Taylor Travel Red Herring Hegeman: Clii,w in the South China 
Sea (Current History 96, September 1997), 261-62. 
53 John Caldwell China's Conventional Naval Capabilities (Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington, D.C., 1994). 
54 Elisabeth Mann Borgese, Norton Ginsburg and Joseph R. Morgan Oceall Yearbook 12 
(Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1996), 279. 
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occurred off Union Reef, as each navy lost a vessel and 120 Vietnamese sailors 
drowned.56 
Even more serious was the violent clash between China and Vietnam in 
March 1988.57 After a small contingent of Vietnamese opened fire on Chinese 
military and construction personnel working on Fiery Cross Reef (Chigua atoll), 
the Chinese dispatched warships to the area, further hostilities erupted, and three 
Vietnamese vessels were sunk, with the loss of seventy-four lives.58 China 
emerged as the clear victor from this episode. Not only did the Fiery Cross Reef 
confrontation reaffirm the PRC's determination to assert sovereignty over the 
Spratlys, it also demonstrated the superiority of Chinese naval power over 
Vietnam. The incident touched off a naval build up between China and Vietnam 
in the islands, as well as a series of competing occupations of more islets by 
troops from both states.59 
The growing naval presence and construction by China and Vietnam of 
military installations on newly occupied islets unsettled other claimants as well. In 
April 1988, forty-nine Filipino fishermen were arrested by Malaysian authorities 
in the Pennatang area of the Spratlys on charges of poaching in Malaysian 
continental shelf waters. 60 
Events during the 1980s made armed conflict in the South China Sea seem 
more likely. Difficulties of demarcating ocean boundaries, uncertain bilateral 
negotiations, and obstacles impeding multilateral discussions all suggested that a 
negotiated settlement for the Spratly dispute was at most a distant aspiration, not a 
near-tenn expectation. Occupying vast areas of the archipelago became critical for 
55 Borgese, Ginsburg and Morgan, Above, 286. 
56 Borgese, Ginsburg and Morgan, Above, 302. 
57 Chang Pao-Min" A New Scramble for the South Sea Islands" (1 June 1990) 12 
ContemporanJ Southenst Asia 17. 
58 Pao-Min, Above. 
59 Pao-Min, Above. 
60 Lee Yong Leng "The Malaysian-Philippine Maritime Dispute" (1 June 1989) 11 
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concerned governments to assert anything approaching legitimate claims of 
sovereignty. It is precisely for these reasons that China, Vietnam, Malaysia, and 
the Philippines were tempted during the 1980s to consolidate territorial gains in 
the Spratly archipelago, and they even sought to expand their respective areas of 
control throughout the South China Sea. Such attempts exacerbated tensions and 
generated armed clashes between China and Vietnam. 
Events during the 1990s generated greater concern over Chinese intentions 
in the South China Sea. In 1992 China began installing sovereignty markers on 
various shoals and islets in Spratlys, but a strong "Declaration on the South China 
Sea" by ASEAN curbed Beijing's assertiveness and prompted the PRC to temper 
its South China Sea activities in 1993 and 1994. 
Despite the PRC's rumblings in the South China Sea, the Cold War's 
passing has brought a general sense of rapprochement to East Asia. This new 
climate should render political costs of a large-scale military conflict in the 
Spratlys unacceptable to claimant governments. Once the current financial 
disturbances abate, the economic expansion of ASEAN countries will resume, and 
the need for maintaining open shipping lanes through the South China Sea will 
become all the more commercially vital. These prospects should dissuade blatant 
attempts by any state to dominate the region militarily. That the claimants' 
economies are becoming more interdependent with other states in Southeast Asia, 
including other Spratly claimants, might amplify that reluctance. 
In the future, China will remain predominant throughout the South China 
Sea. Whether through naval force or diplomacy. Pressures for China to maintain 
claim to the Spratlys will come from increasing resource demands generated by its 
1.2 billion plus people. 61 China is being compelled to fuel its industrial base 
expansion, which supports the greater demands of goods and services for its 
burgeoning population growth. Therefore, more extensive efforts to explore and 
exploit offshore petroleum reserves are required and the Spratlys emerge as a key 
61 China Facts and Figure 2001 Population.< http://www.chinaguide.org/e-
Internet/GQ/HTM/gqindex.htm> (last accessed 1 August 2002). 
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consideration. China has demonstrated its willingness to use military force if 
necessary, to protect and support such operations. 
IV. APPROACHES TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
A. Obstacles to Dispute Resolution 
Anxiety surrounding the sovereignty issue and conflicting claims to the 
Spratlys is obviously aggravated by uncertainty over how many islands, cays, 
reefs, and atolls are actually present. Smaller formations are difficult to identify, 
since many remain submerged at high tide. For a government to allege claims is 
relatively easy. However, to substantiate the presence and exact location of varied 
land formations in the South China Sea is difficult. 
Regional efforts to resolve sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea 
have not been successful. China traditionally has opposed multilateral talks on the 
Spratlys, principally because its sovereignty over the islands is held as non-
negotiable.62 In Beijing's view, a plethora of historic records and artifacts exist to 
support Chinese claims to the Spratlys. That the South China Sea bears the proper 
name of China is in itself indicative of the paramount historical influence of that 
state in the region, and fosters the image of the region being a "Chinese lake". 63 
Driven by strategic bargaining preferences, China isolates the disputants 
and deal with them one-on-one. No negotiations mean no compromise on Chinese 
sovereignty over the Spratly archipelago. The status quo serves Chinese national 
interests by allowing their historical claims to persist. This erodes the ability of 
ASEAN to organize around an issue and allows China the freedom to negotiate 
individually with governments in the region. However, in the future multilateral 
conference, if each government were allocated one vote at the negotiating table, 
China could be outvoted on important issues by a coalition of other claimants.64 
Another special delicate issue for the PRC is the place of Taiwan in any 
conference of multilateral discussions. The recent financial crisis throughout Asia 
62 Harry L Roque "China's Claim to the Spratlys Islands Under International Law" (1997) 
15 JENRL 189, 211 . 
63 Roque, Above. 
64 Roque, Above. 
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in 1998 has given Taiwan the opportunity to break out of its isolation by greatly 
expanding commercial links throughout Southeast Asia via an investment strategy 
known as the "Go South" policy.65 By purchasing corporate and banking assets at 
sale prices, Taiwanese businesses are integrating their investments Asia-wide, and 
in the process enhancing Taiwan's economic influence and political leverage 
against Beijing.66 
Moreover, if both governments were to agree in principle to participate, 
their respective positions must be reconciled on the format of such discussions. 
Both the PRC and the ROC claim all of the Spratlys as their sovereign territory 
and make the same claim to the Spratlys, in the name of "China," based on similar 
historical evidence.67 If they were to enter into formal negotiations as two 
separate and contending parties, that would constitute de facto recognition of two 
Chinas, which neither government will accept.68 For its part, the PRC has 
endorsed diplomatic negotiation in principle, but has preferred limited bilateral 
approaches in fact. 69 
Consider the prospects for regional negotiations on the Spratlys situation. 
Given the multi-party character of the dispute, one might presume that only a 
multilateral conference could produce a meaningful and enforceable agreement. 
Multilateral discussions presume acceptance of the status quo as the basis for 
negotiations. Clearly, this premise lacks appeal to all claimant governments. 
While the Philippines and Malaysia might entertain such multilateral discussions 
quite readily, neither China, nor Vietnam, nor Taiwan could do so without putting 
at risk their longstanding comprehensive claims to the archipelago. Taiwan, 
controlling only one island, could hardly expect to gain much from such a 
65 Keith B. Richburg Exploiting Asin's Crisis: Tniwmz Buys Up Bargains And Widens Its 
Influence (Washington Post, 2 January 1998), A23. 
66 Keith B. Richburg, Above. 
67 Harry L Roque "China's Claim to the Spratlys Islands Under International Law" (1997) 
15 JENRL 189, 212. 
68 Roque, Above. 
69 Christopher C. Joyner "The Spratly Islands Dispute: What Role for Normalizing 
Relations between China and Taiwan?" (1998) 32 NELR 800,819. 
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multilateral negotiation. For China, any decision to engage in multilateral talks 
would immediately undermine its longtime assertions over claims to the entire 
archipelago. China would prefer to engage in bilateral discussions with the 
Philippines or Malaysia, but would balk at jeopardizing any geostrategic 
advantage it holds over Vietnam by negotiating with Hanoi. 
For Vietnam and China, the Spratlys dispute seems cast as a zero-sum 
game. Both claim sovereignty over the entire Spratly archipelago, and if one claim 
is upheld, the other must be denied. Consequently, compromise or partial 
concession by either party would depreciate the legitimacy of their historical 
claims and thus enhance claims by Malaysia and the Philippines. 
Even if all parties can agree to negotiate based on the status quo, the 
fundamental and intractable problem remains of how to apportion the contested 
islands and adjacent sea areas among the claimant states to the satisfaction of all. 
Serious difficulties no doubt complicate apportionment of the central area of the 
archipelago, where power configurations implicit in the present patterns of island 
occupation have established certain spheres of influence that must require 
significant trade-off. It is this same area, moreover, where Vietnam, the 
Philippines, and Taiwan have also constructed military fortifications and airstrips, 
and they will have problems surrendering these islands to each other, much less to 
China. 
For the foreseeable future, China will remain predominant in the Spratlys 
archipelago and throughout the South China Sea. Technology has given the 
Chinese government motives for its policies in the region (namely, potential oil 
exploitation and expanded maritime rights) and the means to execute those 
policies (namely, on-site naval installations and enhanced military capabilities). 
Whether through naval force or diplomacy, pressures for China to maintain claim 
to the Spratlys will come from increasing resource demands generated by its 1.4 
billion plus people. China is being compelled to expand its industrial base to 
support greater demands for more goods and services from its burgeoning 
population growth. To fuel this industrial expansion, new energy sources are 
required, which in tum will require more extensive efforts to explore and exploit 
offshore petroleum reserves. The Spratlys emerge as a key consideration here, and 
China has demonstrated its willingness to use military force, if necessary, to 
protect and support such operations. 
B. Traditional Diplomacy 
The term "diplomacy" refers to the interaction between nation-states. 
Traditionally, government officials or diplomats, who negotiated treaties, trade 
policies, and other international agreements, carried out diplomacy. The process 
of negotiations ranges from very formal to informal, but it tends to be fairly 
adversarial and competitive, relying on distributive or positional bargaining 
strategies that assume a win-lose situation.70 The track one diplomacy is 
characterized as a power-based, fonnal , and often rigid form of official interaction 
between instructed representatives of sovereign nations. The goal is to maintain 
power over weaker nations and a balance of power with nations of equal status. 
Although conflict resolution theorists have developed a multi-faceted 
understanding of power, diplomacy still focuses on the "power over" approach, 
believing that power is a zero sum commodity. This encourages positional 
bargaining, rather than a more integrative or cooperative approach.7 1 
Although several efforts have been made to alter the adversarial nature of 
traditional diplomacy, none has been very successful. The first was the League of 
Nations, which called for open diplomacy and collective security. Although the 
U.S. President Woodrow Wilson developed the plan, the United States failed to 
support the idea, and the League quickly failed. 72 The United Nations was a 
second attempt at collective security and international cooperation. The UN has 
certainly been much more successful than the League of Nations, but it still has 
not been able to overcome power rivalries (especially during the Cold War, but, to 
70 Michael Lee Multi-Track Diplomacy Conflict Research Consortium University of 
Colorado USA<http://www.colorado.edu / conflict/ peace/ treatment/ trackl.htm> (last 
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some extent, even now) and lacks the money to enable it to completely carry out 
its mandate. For this reason, and given the general ineffectiveness of traditional 
diplomacy, more and more attention is being given to what has come to be known 
as "track two" diplomacy. 
In connection with that, the complexity and ambiguity of the conflicting 
claims in the South China Sea have been cited as factors that have frustrated 
previous attempts to arrive at a lasting solution, but the fact that not all positions 
are set in stone may allow flexibility in future negotiations. A wide variety of 
approaches have been presented for consideration if the parties can develop the 
political will to resolve the dispute through negotiations.73 
Suggestions have been made to resolve the South China sea dispute trough 
traditional or "track one" diplomatic initiatives, such as the United Nations 
General Assembly, International Court of Justice (ICJ) or regional organisations 
in which official emissaries engage one another on behalf of their respective 
states. 74 
Institutions such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are considered by some to provide organisational 
frameworks in which to address the claims and jurisdiction to the rocks and waters 
of the South China Sea. 75 In 1994, when the Spratly Islands were put on the ARF 
agenda for the first time, no progress was made. 76 
73United States Institute of Peace The South Chinn Sen Dispute: Prospects for Preventive 
Diplomacy <http: // www.usip.org / oc/ sr /snyder/South China Seal .hhnl> (last 
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75 William G. Stormont Confidence Building for Cooperation in nn Environment of Conflicting 
Claims to Jurisdiction Centre for Asian Legal Studies The University of British Columbia 
<http://faculty.law.ubc.ca/scs/> (last accessed 1 August 2002). 
76 Stormont, Above. 
29 
Attempts to internationalise the dispute on the South China Sea have been 
consistently rejected by the China. China rejected Vietnam's offer to submit the 
bilateral dispute over the Crestone concession let by China to the Crestone Energy 
Corp. of Denver, Colorado to the ICJ for consideration. Vietnam has retained 
Covington and Burling, a prominent Washington-based law firm, to determine 
how the International Court of Justice would settle the dispute.77 
The ICJ administers decisions in cases where the parties are willing to 
submit to a judicial decision. However, in connection with the South China Sea 
dispute, it is difficult to predict how the ICJ might rule such a complex case and 
China is not likely to accept ICJ jurisdiction in the South China Sea. Since, such a 
process would "internationalize" the dispute and run counter to China's preferred 
strategy of dealing with each of the other claimants bilaterally. Asia's reluctance 
to involve Western institutions in helping arbitrate disputes also limits the 
potential role for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in resolving the impasse 
in the South China Sea. 78 
B. Informal Diplomacy 
1. Current Dialogue Efforts 
One of the options of preventing disputes from arising is the pursuit of 
preventive diplomacy in the South China Sea region. This process is through 
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), functional cooperation and direct 
communication. The objective is to promote confidence and cohesion so that any 
problems arising can be solved peacefully and amicably in the so-called ASEAN 
way. 
The process of confidence building among governments involved in the 
South China Sea region has already begun. A regional dialogue on disputes, 
hosted informally through a series of workshops by Indonesia. Although 
77 Barry Wain "Vietnam Fires New Weapon in Oil Dispute: the Law" (June 1995) 16 
TAWSJ. 
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Indonesia is a South China Sea littoral state, it is usually viewed as a neutral party 
in the region, as it makes no claims to the Spratlys.79 These informal dialogues 
adopted the ASEAN way principles,80 such as, seeking agreement and harmony, 
respect for territorial integrity, sensitivity, Politeness, non-confrontation and 
mutual Caring, Quiet and private diplomacy, being non-legalistic and 
concentrating on process and content. 
The Indonesian initiative or the South China Sea Informal Working Group 
encourages confidence among South China Sea states through track two 
diplomacy. Track two diplomacy is characterized as a non governmental, 
informal, and unofficial form of conflict resolution between citizen groups which 
is aimed at de-escalating conflict by reducing anger, fear, and tension and by 
improving communication and mutual understanding. 81 International negotiations 
carried out by private citizens, rather than official diplomats. Most advocates of 
track two approaches argue that they are not a replacement for track one, but 
rather a supplement to them. Often track two approaches can precede official 
negotiations, laying the groundwork and establishing a certain level of trust 
between people, sometimes they occur simultaneously.82 
Ideally, track two diplomatic efforts should pave the way for track one 
negotiations and agreements by encouraging track one official diplomats to 
recognize and utilize crucial information and insights obtained by track two 
citizen diplomats. The concept of track two diplomacy has been growing rapidly 
over the past two decades, especially in the United States. Because of the diversity 
79 Hasjim Djalal and Ian Townsend-Gault Preventive Diplomacy: Ma1Lagi1Lg potential 
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of track two diplomatic efforts, track two diplomacy has been further subdivided 
into four tracks called track two, track three, track four, and track five. Together, 
these five tracks are now commonly referred to as "Multi-Track Diplomacy".83 
Through track two diplomacy, persons from different states who may be 
parties to an international dispute will meet informally and discuss aspects and 
issues of the matter to create an atmosphere of open free discussion, without the 
restrictions imposed by having to maintain official government positions. 84 
The University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada administrates 
the project of sovereignty and jurisdictional disputes over the Spratly and Paracel 
Islands, with its counterpart in Indonesia being the Centre for Southeast Asian 
Studies. Issue-areas for potential cooperation between South China Sea littoral 
governments are identified, and now include marine scientific research, marine 
environmental protection, safety and sea communications, fisheries assessment 
and development, defense and security issues, territorial and jurisdictional issues 
(other than claims to islands and ocean space), and creation of institutions for 
cooperation. 85 
Workshop participants attend in their own private capacity and are drawn 
from governments (particularly the foreign affairs ministries), diplomatic corps 
and military services, academia and research organizations. Technical working 
groups have additionally convened to discuss issues affecting cooperation in 
manne scientific research, resource assessment and means of development, 
marine environmental protection, and navigational safety. 86 Issues raised at these 
meeting are then re-circulated back to the annual workshop plenary meeting and 
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adoption. 87 The process is geared toward informal diplomacy, with the 
expectation that completed agreements on an issue can be returned to normal 
inter-governmental diplomatic channels for eventual negotiation. 
2. Workshop on the South China Sea Dispute 
The Indonesian initiative operates though an informal process, which 
offers participants the advantage of greater freedom to discuss ideas and an 
atmosphere of greater community. In so doing, there is no discussion of 
sovereignty over the Spratlys, or conflicting claims to jurisdiction over ocean 
space, or continental shelf drilling rights.88 Such sensitive issues are not brought 
up. To do so would accomplish nothing constructive, and could seriously risk 
disrupt the entire cooperative process. 89 
New developments from the 1998 workshop included agreements to 
convene special meetings by the Committee for the Co-ordination of Offshore 
Prospecting to compile data on non-hydrocarbon mineral resources in the South 
China Sea and by the Study Group on Zones of Co-operation to examine the 
prospects for joint cooperation and development. In addition, the Legal Matters 
Group would be charged with discussing the possible content of various codes of 
conduct that might be applied to activities in the region.90 
From this regional cooperative activities, a strategy of confidence-building 
is in progress, and while achieving few visible solid results, the workshop sessions 
and their spin-off committee discussions have provided opportunities for 
participants to air their views, thus compelling claimant governments to recognize 
87 Djalal and Townsend-Gault, Above. 
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differences of opinion, rather than merely ignoring them. 91 The workshops are not 
a quick fix for demilitarization of joint resource development in the South China 
Sea, but involve a process aimed toward regional cooperation. 
China has supported the workshop process, although the government 
apparently feels that the process is going too far, too fast. For China, prolonged 
patience is a diplomatic virtue when it comes to formulating arrangements in the 
South China Sea. 92 China acknowledges the need to develop confidence building 
among states in the region, but unwilling to discuss other CBMs, which it feels lie 
beyond the capacity of the workshop.93 Perhaps most significant, China has 
intimated a willingness in principle to put aside territorial claims in favor of joint 
development. 
The workshops represent the most senous regional effort thus far for 
promoting peace and cooperation in the South China Sea. Through track two 
diplomacy, these meetings serve as informal, private fora for confidence building 
among nationals from states involved in Spratly Islands jurisdictional disputes.94 
They have been purposefully designed to bring together representatives from 
concerned states in the region to discuss non-polemical issues affecting 
environment, navigation, pollution control, marine research, and possible means 
of cooperation. 
The major contribution of the workshops is that they have moved away 
from political confrontation, military conflict, and diplomatic inertia toward a 
process of dialogue and cooperation on the long road to dispute settlement.95 In 
that manner, these workshops have also fostered more salient appreciation of joint 
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95 William G. Stormont Confidence Building for Cooperation in an Environment of Conflicting 
Claims to Jurisdiction Centre for Asian Legal Studies The University of British Columbia 
<http://faculty.law.ubc.ca / scs/> (last accessed 1 August 2002) 
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development as a potentially useful regional approach towards eventual resolution 
of the Spratly Islands dispute. 
3. The Workshop Process 
After the Cambodian settlement through the Paris Peace Agreement in 
1990, the attention for peace and cooperation in Southeast Asia were focussing on 
the next conflict agenda, the South China Sea. Confrontation in the South China 
Sea would be much more serious and would invite the involvement of non-
regional states. It was therefore essential to seek ways and means of preventing 
potential conflicts from erupting into armed conflagration. Since the states 
concerned were unlikely to seek third-party settlement of their various disputes, a 
different approach was required. It was necessary to find a way of building 
confidence and trust in the South China Sea area. 
In the late 1980s, the disputes concerning sovereignty over the Paracels 
and the Spratlys were becoming prominent issues, which might pose threats to 
Southeast Asian security. Dr. Djalal had been among those who foresaw the 
possible escalation of a dangerous situation, and had conceived of the possibility 
of convening informal meetings to discuss confidence building and co-operation, 
not sovereignty and jurisdiction.96 He was drawing on experiences with the 
Fisheries Task force off the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC), of 
which he was a leading member, in facilitating co-operation between the states of 
Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, and Pacific Latin America, where formal 
inter-governmental initiatives had foundered. 97 
Dr. Djalal and Prof. Ian Townsend-Gault developed a concept document 
on a workshop on petroleum joint development in Southeast Asia, which was 
submitted to the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs. This led to sufficient 
96Hasjim Ojala] "South China Sea Island Disputes11 (2000) 8 TRBZ 9, 21. 
97 Djalal, Above. 
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financial support from the Canadian International Development Agency for the 
first phases of the initiative. 98 
The concept of informal meetings on co-operation and confidence building 
had two basic objectives. First, to manage the potential conflicts by seeking an 
area in which everyone could cooperate and secondly, to develop confidence 
building measures or processes so that the various claimants would be 
comfortable with one another, thus providing a conducive atmosphere for the 
solution of their territorial or jurisdictional disputes. 99 
The First Workshop on the South China Sea was organised in Bali in 
January 1990. ASEAN participants specifically and exclusively attended this 
Workshop so that they could lay down the groundwork. The topics of the meeting 
were territorial and sovereignty issues, political and security issues, marine 
scientific research and environmental protection, safety of navigation, resources 
management, and institutional mechanism for cooperation. 100 The Workshop also 
discussed the possibility to include other non-ASEAN countries in the next 
discussion on the South China Sea, particularly Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Laos 
and Cambodia. 101 But it was not easy to bring in China into the discussion, 
primarily because China considered that the South China Sea issues should not be 
"internationalized" and be difficult for China to sit down with Taiwan in an 
international meeting like the South China Sea Workshop, if it were to be a 
"formal" meeting. 
The Second Workshop was in Bandung in 1991. The meeting had become 
very "inclusive", Vietnam, China, Taiwan were invited. Even land-locked Laos 
were also invited. Cambodia was invited later after the domestic political situation 
98 Djalal, Above. 
99 Djalal, Above. 
100 Statement of the First "Wokshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China 
Sea" (Bali, Indonesia, 1990). 
101 Statement of the First, Above. 
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became clearer. 102 In Bandung the meeting went into more detail discussing the 
various topics of the first workshop, the roles of major non-South China Sea 
powers in the region, as well as confidence building measures. 103 
More technical discussions took place on the issues of marine scientific 
research, marine environmental protection and safety of navigation as well as on 
resources management. Some ideas to establish a secretariat and to formalize the 
meeting were aired. More significantly, the participants attending the Bandung 
meeting agreed to issue a statement saying that the South China Sea disputes 
should be settled peacefully, that force shall not be used to settle the disputes and 
that parties to the disputes shall exercise restraint in order not to exacerbate the 
potential conflicts. 104 This statement was a precursor to a much more formal 
ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea in Manila in 1992 and has become 
guiding principles for efforts to manage potential conflicts in the South China Sea 
through cooperation. 105 China also pledged to abide by the 1992 ASEAN 
statement, which had called for mutual restraint in South China Sea activities. 
The Third Workshop was in Y ogyakarta in 1992; more specific 
discussions took place on the cooperative projects by establishing specific 
technical working groups and experts groups. 106 The meeting agreed to establish 
two technical working groups (TWG), namely the TWG on Marine Scientific 
Research and the TWG on Resources Assessment. 107 
The Fourth Workshop was in Surabaya in 1993; the issue of participation 
of non-South China Sea countries was already discussed. It was agreed that non-
SCS participation would be allowed on a case by case basis to implement specific 
102 Statement of the Second "Wokshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South 
China Sea" (Bandung, Indonesia,1991). 
103 Statement of the Second, Above. 
104 Statement of the Second, Above. 
10s "Manila, Beijing agree on Spratlys Code of Conduct" (10 August 1995) Reuters. 
106 Statement of the Third "Wokshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China 
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agreed programes of cooperation. 108 In the meantime, the TWO on Marine 
Scientific Research (TWG-MSR) had already begun discussions in Manila and the 
TWO on Resources Assessment (TWO-RA) had been convened in Jakarta. 109 The 
Surabaya meeting also discussed the results and recommendations of the two 
TWO meetings, and further agreed to convene follow-up meeting of the TWO-
MS in Singapore. It also agreed to establish the TWO on Marine Environmental 
Protection (TWG-MEP) and the TWO on Legal Matters- (TWG-LM) and 
discussed the possibility of establishing the TWO on Safety of Navigation, 
Shipping and Communications (TWG-SNSC). Finally, the participants also 
indicated that the workshop series had "reached a stage where it would have to 
concretize programs or projects to realize cooperative efforts on the basis of a 
step-by-step approach ... ". 110 
The Fifth Workshop was in Bukittinggi in 1994. The meeting had already 
approved some specific projects for cooperation formulated by the Technical 
Working Groups, particularly a program for cooperation on the study and 
conservation of bio-diversity in the South China Sea. 111 The Bukittinggi 
Workshop further agreed, inter alia, to authorize Dr. Djalal to seek support and 
funding for the project proposal on bio-diversity; to convene another meeting of 
the TWO on Marine Scientific Research to finalise proposals on sea level and tide 
monitoring, and on database, information exchange and networking, and to 
convene the first meeting of the TWO on Legal Matters in Thailand. 112 
Until January 1, 1999, the Technical Working Group on Marine Scientific 
Research has met six times. Manila (June 1993), Surabaya (August 1993), 
Singapore (April 1994), Hanoi (June 1995), Cebu (July 1996), and Manila again 
10s Statement of the Fourth "Wokshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South 
China Sea" (Surabaya, Indonesia, 23-25 August 1993). 
109 Statement of the Fourth, Above. 
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111 Statement of the Fifth "Wokshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China 
Sea" (Bukittinggi, Indonesia, 26-28 October 1994). 
112 Statement of the Fifth, Above. 
(November 1998. 113 In addition to the proposed project on biodiversity protection, 
this TWG has developed two additional projects of co-operation, namely "Study 
on Tides and Sea level Change", and "Regional Co-operation in the field of 
Marine Science Data and Information Network in the South China Sea". These 
proposals were adopted by Sixth Workshop in Balikpapan in 1995. 114 
Contributions by the governments of Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia and Singapore 
has made it possible to commence implementation of the project on biodiversity 
protection, but full execution of this activity will require major funding and 
negotiation to obtain such support. 
The TWG on Marine Environmental Protection has met three times. 
Hangzhou (China) in 1994, Hainan (China) in 1997, and Manila in 1998 (the joint 
meeting with Marine Scientific Research). This TWG has formulated a project of 
co-operation on training program for ecosystem monitoring in the South China 
Sea. 115 The project was been approved in principle by the Eighth Workshop in 
Pacet, Puncak (Indonesia), and December 1997. At the Joint Meeting in Manila, 
1998, it was agreed that an ad hoe group of five or so experts would meet to 
subject the proposal to thorough revision in light of comments, and the final 
version should be reconsidered and adopted in 1999. 
The TWG on Resources Assessment has met in Jakarta, in 1993 and 
December 1998. The 1993 meeting agreed to appoint 3 co-ordinators. Indonesia 
for the study of geological basin with regard to hydrocarbon potentials, Vietnam 
to prepare a study on hard minerals in the South China Sea and Thailand to 
prepare study on living resources. 116 The efforts of Indonesia and Vietnam 
stumbled on the difficulty in overcoming territorial and jurisdictional issues due to 
113 Statement of the Sixth Meeting of the "Technical Working Group on Marine Scientific 
Research in the South China Sea" (Manila, 25-28 November 1998). 
114 Statement of the Sixth "Wokshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China 
Sea" (Balikpapan, Indonesia, 9-13 October 1995). 
m Statement of the Second Meeting of "the Group of Experts on Marine Environmental 
Protection in the South China Sea" (Manila, the Philippines, 25-28 November 1998). 
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the sensitive nature of the subjects. The 1998 Meeting considered a proposal from 
Indonesian experts to compile a database on non-living non-hydrocarbon 
resources of the South China Sea, in which the Committee for the Co-ordination 
of Offshore Prospecting in Bangkok would be invited to collaborate. This 
proposal was adopted by the Meeting, and then by the 9th Workshop (Jakarta, 
1998). 117 
The TWG on Legal Matters has met in Phuket in 1995, in Chiang Mai in 
1997 and Pattaya in 1998. Numerous legal issues involved in developing the co-
operative efforts have been discussed. It has agreed that legal officers of the South 
China Sea countries should exchange information and documentation as well as 
collect various legislation regarding the South China Sea, particularly on 
environmental matters. The Fourth Meeting in 1999, focussed on environmental 
legislation. 118 
A new activity, which falls loosely under the heading "legal matters", was 
commenced in 1998. The Study Group on Zones of Co-operation, which was 
convened in Vientiane, Laos, in May 1998. This idea arose from a proposal made 
at the th Workshop. 119 The reasoning was that "joint development" was a much-
used phrase, but not all participants were aware of the many different 
arrangements, which fell into this category. The title 'zones of co-operation' was 
adopted to allow coverage of the full range of co-operative jurisdictional 
arrangements at sea, including joint fishing zones and cross-boundary oilfields. 
Resource persons prepared a comprehensive set of materials, comprising the texts 
of relevant treaties, as well as academic writings, and presentations covered 
116 Statement of the Eighth "Wokshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China 
Sea" (Puncak, Indonesia, 2-6 December 1997). 
117 Statement of the Ninth "Wokshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China 
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118 Statement Of the Fourth Meeting of "The Technical Working Group On Legal Matters 
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119 Statement of the Third Meeting of "The Technical Working Group on Legal Matters in 
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developments in all parts of the globe. 120 Some issues were discussed in detail, 
e.g. the application of civil and criminal law on installations within a joint 
development area. Its results discussed at the 9th Workshop. 121 
4. Confidence Building 
The resolution of the Cambodia situation in 1991 has allowed Southeast 
Asian states to focus their attention on the South China Sea as a potential arena for 
regional conflict. Asian states do not formulate vacuum foreign policies for the 
South China Sea issue. Considerably overlapping jurisdictional claims, persistent 
military occupation of islands, aggravated military spending and the leasing of 
disputed areas to international petroleum companies have all combined to 
aggravate tensions among states in the region. The issue of sovereignty disputes in 
the South China Sea thus surfaced in the early 1990s as a serious regional 
concern. 
The ingredient most necessary for resolving the South China Sea is 
sustained confidence and transparency between the governments of Southeast 
Asia and China. Confidence and trust among governments are critical for progress 
in successful negotiations. Mechanisms for enhancing CBMs among claimant 
states remains critical for launching negotiations, which aimed for cooperation in 
the South China Sea. Through CBMs, functional cooperation and direct 
communication could be fostered among the claimants as a means to preclude 
territorial disagreements from escalating into military confrontation. 122 Measures 
for building confidence can lead to a better climate for negotiations and more 
positive results. 
Confidence building aims at making the political climate more conducive 
to certainty. Confidence building engenders working relationships where the trust, 
120 Statement of the Third Meeting, Above. 
121 Statement of the Ninth, Above. 
122 Michael S Lund. Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategi; for Preventive Diplomacy (United 
States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1996), 31. 
understanding, and respect built up over time can make subsequent negotiations 
easier, more efficient, and more constructive. 123 This can only come about through 
increased transparency of national policies and capabilities. Transparency thus 
becomes key to confidence building. In the case of the South China Sea, several 
measures can contribute to transparency and thus build confidence among the 
concerned governments. 
One of the focus areas of the workshop is the promotion of Confidence-
Building Measures (CBM) or a Confidence-Building Process (CBP). 124 Statement 
was made on the need to resolve any territorial or jurisdictional disputes in the 
South China Sea by "peaceful means through dialogue and negotiation", that 
"force should not be used to settle territorial and jurisdictional disputes", and that 
"the parties involved in such disputes are urged to exercise self-restraint in order 
not to complicate the situation" .125 This statement also was adopted as the 
ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea in Manila in July 1992. This 
illustrates of how accomplishments in "track two" can find their way to "track 
one" fora. 
The situation in the South China Sea is also kept under review by various 
fora and officials. It is also much scrutinised by researchers and academics. It has 
made a contribution to the overall debate by identifying aspects of the whole 
picture, which are sometimes ignored or neglected because of insufficient (and 
accessible) data. The South China Sea issues now is also being discussed in other 
formal and informal fora, such as in the ASEAN-China Dialogue, in the Informal 
Talks within ARF as well as in ASEAN-ISIS. There is no direct link between the 
workshop and these activities, but there are clear signs of support for the 
Workshop Process, e.g. from the ASEAN-European Union Dialogue, the Non 
Aligned Movement and various governments and international organizations. It 
indicated that this support might assume tangible dimensions in the near future. 
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In the course of Workshop discussions over the years various confidence 
building measures or processes have been raised, such as, the need for "non-
expansion of existing military presence." 126 This principle was supported by many 
but opposed by a few, arguing that this was not a matter for the Workshop to 
discuss. The possibility of "exchange of military commanders" who are 
responsible for the security of the multiple claims area in the Spratly Islands group 
was also supported by some and opposed by others. 127 Again, arguing that, was 
not a matter for the Workshop to discuss. It was suggested, however, that some 
transparency of the activities in the disputed area was needed. 128 In other words, 
the workshop tried to look for CBMs or CBPs that could secure the respect and 
participation of all. 
The latest Confidence Building Processing as the result of the workshop is 
the Anambas expedition. Pursuant to the final Statement of the Eleventh 
Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea (Cengkareng, 
26 - 29 March, 2001 ), the Research and Development Agency of the Department 
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia in cooperation with "Pusat Studi 
Kawasan Asia Tenggara", the National University of Singapore, and the 
Indonesian Science Institute (LIPI) carried out an expedition called the "Anambas 
Expedition" to explore and study the biodiversity of Anambas Islands. 129 
The "Anambas Expedition" is a breakthrough in exercising confidence-
building measures for managing potential conflict in the South China Sea, 
involving interested parties in the South China Sea region. It is the first expedition 
126 Statement of the Fifth "Wokshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China 
Sea" (Bukittinggi, Indonesia, 26-28 October 1994). 
127 Statement of the "Sixth Wokshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea" 
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129 Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs Ana111bas Expedition a Confidence Building 
Measure for Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea (9 - 23 March 2002) 
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of its kind that involves scientists from the reg10n. The expedition itself is 
regarded as a collective endeavor in conducting marine scientific research in the 
area and in the framework of developing concrete programs of cooperation in 
managing potential conflicts through second track diplomacy. It also symbolizes a 
synergy between the first and the second track diplomacies, to establish closer ties 
between scientists and governments in the region and to provide concrete results 
for the benefit of the peoples in the region. 130 
The expedition explored the Islands of Anambas, a group of islands 
situated in the South China Sea, approximately 130 nautical miles Northeast of 
the Eastern entrance of the Singapore Strait, within the waters of the Republic of 
Indonesia. The Islands are located around 225 nautical miles from Batam Island 
and, at a moderate speed, can be reached in about 24 hours from the point of 
departure at Batu Ampar Port, Batam. Anambas Islands have been selected as a 
venue for the expedition essentially because they are a non-contentious area. In 
the spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding, the governments of the South 
China Sea region have contributed to the cost of the expedition. The expedition is 
followed by a three-day workshop at the National University of Singapore. The 
results of the biodiversity survey will be further studied in various fields and its 
report is discussed during the forthcoming 12th Workshop on Managing Potential 
Conflicts in the South China Sea, which is held in Bandung in May 2002. 13 1 
The workshop continues its efforts to identify such measures and its 
process of Confidence Building is infonnal. However it is a consensual process, 
where all participants feel free to exchange views for lasting solutions. This 
process also aims to temper distrust and to promote compromises that lead to 
mutual benefits and cooperation. 
l 30 Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, Above. 
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V. PROSPECTS FOR JOINT RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
A. Background. 
The most salient shift of emphasis between the law of the sea in 1945 and 
after it developed in 1975, was the qualification of previously enjoyed unilateral 
rights by concepts which required different fonns of collaboration or co-operation. 
States had to come to terms with the fact that their rights were qualified by 
obligations, often to neighboring states. Nowhere were these obligations more 
tangible than between the littoral states of a semi-enclosed sea. This concept, like 
that of single ecosystem management, which evolved by scientists, posed new 
challenges for lawyers and policymakers. The most pertinent provisions of the 
1982 Convention addressing the need ( or obligation) for different forms of co-
operation are those dealing with the regimes of the EEZ (Articles 61- 67) and that 
of Enclosed or Semi Enclosed Seas (Article 123). 
Creation of a joint authority dedicated to common development of 
resources within the Spratlys area may be the most appealing and logical solution 
for a territorial dispute as convoluted as this one. Establishing a "Spratly Resource 
Development Authority" would be consistent with statements by the Chinese 
government which aver that while sovereignty over the Spratly Islands is non-
negotiable, joint ventures to exploit the natural resources of the South China Sea 
may be discussed. 132 
Essential for establishing a cooperative joint development regime in the 
South China Sea is agreement by the parties to set aside, without prejudice, their 
claims to the Spratlys and jointly form a "Spratly Resource Development 
Authority" for managing resource exploitation, including fisheries, the 
enviromnent, and safety of navigation. In this respect, defusing the Spratly Islands 
dispute would not require resolution of the protracted sovereignty question. 
132 Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen "Chinese Drilling Ship Leaves Disputed 
Waters" (4 November 1992) Economic Newswire Japan. 
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Rather, a kind of multilateral "Authority" analogous to that for mining the deep 
seabed in the 1982 LOS Convention might be established. 133 
A Spratly Authority could well serve all the claimants' interests. Costs 
involved in unilateral exploration are enormous; military bases on the islands 
impede extraction of resources in the area; and so long as the dispute persists, the 
region will remain threatened with instability. A cooperative regime such as a 
joint resource development authority would offer a relatively quick solution and 
palatable compromise. Such an authority could freeze all claims for the indefinite 
future, ensure demilitarization of the zone, facilitate resource exploitation and 
provide acceptable mechanisms for dispute resolution. 134 
B. Economic Development 
The uncertainty over maritime boundaries has contributed to insecurity felt 
in many states. This insecurity is being felt in the manner in which hydrocarbon 
exploration and production is being conducted in the area. While hydrocarbon 
exploration and production operations are well established along the coastal areas 
of the littoral states little is known of the rest of the South China Sea and the 
Spratlys in particular. 
In 1989, the Chinese government sent a survey vessel through the South 
China sea and estimated that the Spratlys held deposits of 25 billion cubic metres 
of natural gas, 370,000 tons of phosphorous and 105 billion barrels of oil with an 
additional 91 billion barrels of oil in the James Shoal area off the North Borneo 
coast. 135 In 1988, the US geologists estimated reserves of 2.1-15.8 billion barrels 
of oil while Russian estimates are 7.5 billion barrel of oil equvalents, 70 per cent 
133 Mark J. Valencia" A Spratly Solution" (31 March 1994) Far Eastern Economic Review 1. 
134 Mark J. Valencia and Masahiro "Southeast Asian States: Joint Development of 
Hydrncarbons in Overlapping Claim Areas?" (1986) 16 ODIL 211. 
135 John W. Garver "China's Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of 
Bureaucratic and National Interests" (September 1992) The China Quarterly 101. 
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of which are probably gas resources. 136 In addition to oil and gas deposits the area 
is also rich in tin, manganese, copper, cobalt, nickel and other materials. 137
 The 
waters around the Spratly and Paracel islands are also rich in fish stocks. 
Malaysia also has found gas fields in disputed waters, where as, its main 
oil production fields are much closer to shore. In the James Shoal area off the 
Sarawak coast, Malaysia has estimate reserves of 12 trillion cubic metres of gas. 
Brunei has also developed a large offshore capability but has restricted its activity 
to areas close to shore. The only production activity off the Philippine coast is 
also well within its archipelagic waters. Estimates of the reserves for these areas 
range between 60 and 300 billion barrels of oil. 138 Vietnam has also been more 
successful with the Bach Ho and Rong fields which are situated off the Southeast 
Vietnamese coast near Ho Chi Minh City total reserves for these fields are 
estimated at 400 billion barrels of oil with current production of 170,000 harries 
of oil per day. 
It is important to note that the majority of the exploration and almost all of 
the production in the South China Sea are being conducted well within the 
territorial seas of the littoral states. Except, China has begun exploration off 
Vanguard Bank, which is much closer to Vietnam and Natuna Island (Indonesia) 
than Mainland China. 
C. Security Implications 
The security implications of this rush for hydrocarbons are quite 
substantial. The discovery of the natural resources potential, if not actuality, of the 
are has increased the stake in the disputes. In addition to complicating the nature 
of the overlapping claims, unilateral exploration and development of oil and gas in 
136 Bruce Blanche and Jean Blanche "Oil and Regional Stability in the South China Sea" 
(November 1995) Jane's Intelligence Review, 511 . 
137 Eoin H. MacDonald Offshore Minerals Other than Hydrocarbons in Southeast Asia in 
Chie Lin Sien and Colin MacAndrews eds. Southeast Asian Seas: Frontiers of 
Development (McGraw Hill, Singapore, 1981), 56. 
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the disputed area can lead to military confrontations. Tensions over the territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea have recently spilled-over to impact on 
hydrocarbon exploration activities in the region. 
In May 1993 a Chinese Ministry of Geology se1sm1c survey vessel 
ventured into Block 5-2, under lease to British Petroleum (BP) and Norway's 
Statoil. BP has drilled two wells in this block but the results have been kept secret 
because of Vietnamese concern over China's reaction. The Chinese vessel refused 
to leave the block despite Vietnam's protests. 139 
Tensions were further increased m April 1994. Following the 
announcement by Crestone Energy Corporation of Denver that it would begin a 
seismic survey of the Wan'an Bei-21 (WAB-21) block it had leased from China, 
Mobil Corporation announced that it had entered into a production sharing 
contract with Vietnam for the Blue Dragon area (Block 5-lB) which borders 
W AB-21. 140 Mobil began their surveys, the Vietnamese and Chinese Navies 
began to harass these efforts. In July 1994 China announced that it had sent two 
warships to the area to stop the Vietnamese operations and did blockade a 
Vietnamese rig operating within the W AB-21 area. The Chinese turned back at 
least one Vietnamese vessel that was ferrying supplies to the rig. 141 
In August the Vietnamese retaliated when one of their warships forced a 
Chinese research vessel to leave the Crestone area. Tensions were reduced, 
however, in November when the Chinese and Vietnamese leaders met in Hanoi 
and agreed to "refrain from all acts that make things more complicated or broaden 
conflicts" .142 The most significant event in this standoff was the Chinese refusal to 
resist the Vietnamese expulsion of the Chinese Navy's research ship out of the 
Crestone concession. This is probably because the Chinese did not want to 
139 Yojana Sharma "Asia Shook Up Over Sino-Vietnamese Spratlys Handshake" (26 November 
1994) Inter Press Service. 
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frighten the ASEAN states. Moreover as Westerners were on board the Chinese 
may be willing to show restraint in order not to frighten off investors. 
While the immediate crises were resolved peacefully in 1994 the failure of 
the Vietnamese and Chinese leaders to agree on some form of code of conduct in 
the disputed area allows for future clashes to occur. Indeed Vietnam is defying 
China by going ahead with exploratory drilling in Block 135, which overlaps the 
southern portion of W AB-21. A drilling rig operated by VietPetro containing 
Russian technicians was deployed in the area in January 1995. In February 1995 
Vietnam also opened tenures for blocks 122-130 all in waters claimed by China. 
There has been little interest in the area, however, as it would be in the deepest 
waters off the Vietnamese coast and little is known about the area. 
There has also been a great deal of concern in Indonesia over the full 
extent of the Chinese claim. In July 1995, however, the foreign ministers of the 
two countries met in Beijing and according to Ali Alatas, the Indonesian foreign 
minister, and the Chinese assured him that China did not claim any of the waters 
around Natuna. China's increased reliance on external sources of oil and gas may 
be forcing it to modify its claim. China has begun negotiations with Indonesia and 
Malaysia for liquefied natural gas from the Indonesian Natuna fields and the 
Malaysian Central Luconia fields. Both of these areas are within the Chinese 
historic waters claim and if China agrees to purchase the gas from these two sites 
it will signal de facto acknowledgement of Malaysian and Indonesian sovereignty 
over the areas. 
While China appears to be distancing itself from its claims over the 
Natuna gas fields, Indonesia continues to be watchful of Chinese actions. In 
October 1995 it announced that it would base a squadron of its newly acquired 
British-made Hawk-200 fighter jets in West Kalimantan on Borneo Island, at its 
closest base to the Natuna fields. 
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D. Joint Development Areas 
The idea of setting aside claims to sovereignty in favor of joint resource 
development has been articulated on many occasions by Chinese representatives. 
However, the Chinese concept of "joint resource development" appears to be 
defined as bilateral cooperation in disputed areas, while ASEAN claimants appear 
to prefer a multilateral joint development scheme. A series of bilateral 
development agreements would in effect expand the Chinese claim to resources in 
contested areas that would most likely not be open to Chinese participation 
following a final settlement. 
The idea of joint resource development has been proposed in vanous 
forms, including as part of the Indonesian-hosted workshops. University of 
Hawaii and East-West Center researchers Mark Valencia, Jon Van Dyke, and 
Noel Ludwig have developed a range of possible options for consideration as part 
of a multilateral joint resource development authority similar to the Antarctic 
Treaty, a multilateral agreement to share resources in Antarctica. The Timor Gap 
treaty between Australia and Indonesia, agreements in the Persian Gulf, and other 
bilateral resource development agreements provide ample precedent for 
considering this approach; however, a multilateral maritime development 
authority, if implemented, would be the first of its kind. 
While there are numerous precedents for such an arrangement, it should be 
noted that such a mechanism is not a solution in and of itself but rather a 
demonstration of the political will of the various claimants to reach a working 
arrangement to manage the disputed territory. There are four main reasons states 
may be willing to enter into Joint Development Areas (JDAs). First, the desire, in 
each state, to produce hydrocarbon resources outweighs the desire to win a 
boundary dispute, or some other item on the national agenda of each of the states 
Second, the states already have close relations or they see the opportunity, in the 
JDA, to demonstrate trust, amity and friendship which will lead to closer 
relations. Third, where one or more state does not possess the technological 
expertise for offshore development and the others see the opportunity to gain by 
selling such technology to the others. Finally, when all lack sufficient 
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management capacity, then by pooling resources m a JDA could allow all to 
effectively exploit their offshore resources. 143 
In order for a JDA to be practical the states involved must accept that they 
are sharing the resources in the area with all. Should any consider the agreement 
to be an interim measure that can be revoked at any time the agreement is doomed 
to failure. In addition the terms and conditions of the agreement must be fully 
supported and accepted by all the participants. Finally, the member-states need to 
remember that the most important objective of the JDA is the search for and 
development of resources in the area. 
There are also several questions that would have to be addressed in terms 
of a South China Sea JDA. Who would be included? Where would the agreement 
take place? How would revenues be divided? Finally, who would manage the 
exploitation that is would national governments or a supra-national committee 
retain granting rights? 
The first two of these questions can be combined in raising the point of the 
second: that is, what area will fall under the agreement? The Spratlys are not a 
group of large islands that are easily identifiable as a group or chain. The majority 
of the named features in the Spraltys are not islands at all, but reefs, rocks and 
cays. A realistic assessment of the features, under international law would allow 
perhaps a dozen or so islets to generate 12 nautical mile territorial seas but not 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Another solution would be to derive a joint 
development area based on overlapping territorial or historic water, EEZ and 
continental shelf claims. The problem with this approach is that the multiple claim 
area, which would become the JDA, rewards those with the most extravagant 
claims. This leads to the question of membership. Under these alternatives those 
with the most extravgent claims to the area would be granted full participation in 
143 William G. Stormont and Ian Townsend-Gault "Offshore Joint Development: 
Functional Instrument? Compromise? Obligation?" ( 1994 Conference of the International 
Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham-England, July 1994), 24. 
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the JDA while those with partial claims to the multiple claim area would be 
granted only limited rights. 
The division of revenues and the management of the development are also 
important questions that need to be addressed in any JDA. Again issues of 
membership are affected in determining the proportion of total revenues each 
member would receive. In the South China Sea the China-Taiwan dispute has 
added significance as they would either have to be allotted separate allotments or 
would have to agree to share a Chinese' portion. The development of a 
management structure for the JDA is also important. Would a supra-national 
management committee be struck and how would national governments be 
represented on the committee? 
Would this committee be given authority to develop, implement and 
enforce policies on granting of exploration and production rights, civil and 
criminal jurisdiction, disposition of resources, reserves management 
environmental and safety issues, foreign investment limits and provisions 
regarding deposits located along the boundary of the zone. 144 
Professors David Denoon and Steven Brams of New York University have 
proposed that a new mathematical technique called "fair division" be used to help 
facilitate the negotiations over sovereignty. They suggest a two-stage negotiation: 
first between ASEAN and China and then among ASEAN members. In fair 
division, each side is given an agreed-upon number of points to allocate over 
various assets they desire and a neutral umpire then calculates how to divide the 
assets in a way that gives each side the same percentage of its preferences. As an 
example, Denoon and Brams suggest that the South China Sea could be divided 
into five zones and the PRC and ASEAN could bid for the areas that were most 
important to them. Thus, the PRC and A SEAN might each get some of the islands 
and some of the deep-water hydrocarbon development areas. The advantage of 
141 William G. Stormont and Ian Townsend-Gault "Ocean Diplomacy, Joint Development 
and International Law" (the Ninth Asia Pacific Round table, Kuala Lumpur-Malaysia, 
June 1994). 
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this technique is that it would be fair and resolves sovereignty definitively, thus 
making it easier to get businesses to invest in the follow-on development needed. 
A IDA is impractical in the South China Sea, as there is no agreement 
among the claimant's states over any of these points. There is no indication 
among any of the claimant's states, with the possible exception of the Philippines 
that the search and production of oil and gas outweighs their desire to gain 
sovereignty over their claim area. Malaysia is unwilling to allow any JDA to 
include the area that they claim. Vietnam will not allow any joint development 
that will include parts of its continental shelf. China and Taiwan do support joint 
development but insist the agreement cover the entire disputed area. Moreover 
this can only occur after the others recognise Chinese sovereignty in the area. This 
leaves only the Philippines and to a lesser extent Vietnam as the only supporters 
of a multilateral joint develoment agreement for the area. 
E. Results of the Workshop on the Joint Cooperation. 
The Workshop process has the scope and scale of ideas and proposals for 
co-operation, which have been advanced since its work began. They have 
succeeded in attracting the participation of a great number of the most senior 
experts in the region in a variety of fields, marine science, ecology, marine 
environmental protection, navigational safety, hydrography, geology, and law. 
Many of the participants in the Exchange of Hydrographic Data and Information 
are the Hydrographers for their respective countries. The fact that regional 
authorities facilitate their participation is further evidence of the degree to which 
the region is committed to the search for peace in the South China Sea. 145 
The modalities of implementing the agreed project proposals were 
discussed and the most salient problems are financial support and the 
transformation of the perception of political obstacles into political will of 
145 Statement of the Second Meeting of "The Group of Experts on Hydrographic Data 
and Information Exchange in the South China Sea" (Singapore, 20 October 1998). 
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cooperation. 146 Practically all countries m the South China Sea have indicated 
willingness to participate in the implementation of the agreed programs either in 
providing expertise, facilities or even financial resources. But there is also a 
school of opinion which holds that implementation should be left to national 
institutions alone, due to the sensitive nature of the issues dealing with territorial 
and sovereignty claims. 147 
In his Keynote Address, Indonesian foreign Minister Alatas recommended 
the Eighth workshop participants to approach this issue with a new sense of 
purpose, promoting joint implementation of the agreed programs for cooperation. 
Mr. Gary Smith, then Canadian Ambassador took up this theme to Jakarta. 148 
Speaking on behalf of the Canadian International Development Agency, 
Ambassador Smith not only added his voice to those urging a focus on 
implementation, but also indicated that CIDA was willing to make available 
"modest support" in aid.149 
A start was made with the Study Group on Zones of Co-operation in 1998. 
With a quasi-lecture style supported by 400 pages set of materials, a framework 
was created whereby participants could absorb information from experts, ask 
questions and most importantly of all volunteer information. The meeting marked 
by such a high degree of collegiality and success. The cooperation activities have 
drawn the interest of a large number of organisations, governmental and non-
govemmental, domestic and international. Many have indicated willingness to pay 
a useful role in the Workshop process. This places the workshop participants to 
146 Statement of the Seventh "Wokshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South 
China Sea" (Batam, Indonesia, 1996). 
147 Statement of the Seventh, Above. 
148 Statement of the Eighth "Wokshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South 
China Sea" (Puncak, Indonesia, 2-6 December 1997). 
149 Statement of the Eighth, Above. 
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enter into discussions with them m an attempt to marry their priorities and 
claimants' interests. 150 
The workshops focussed on encouraging discussion and dialogue among 
the parties to the territorial disputes with the aim of finding the basis for a solution 
that would be acceptable to all concerned. This brings to the subject of joint 
development. Joint development is one of those concepts which means different 
things to different people, and some of these ideas have little basis in reality. For 
this reason, the work of the Study Group on Zones of Co-operation could fill an 
important gap in the knowledge base of a number of participants. Joint 
development, through the First TWG on Resource Assessment and the Study 
Group on Zones of Co-operation agreed: 151 
1. That the joint development concept has excellent potential for application in 
the South China Sea, especially given the statement of Chinese Prime Minister 
Li Peng in Singapore in 1990, and repeated smce, expressing China's 
willingness to shelve territorial or sovereignty claims in favour of joint 
development. 
2. That we should study the various concepts or models of joint development 
around the world and to consider which aspects of these experiences could be 
applied to the South China Sea area. 
3. That we should apply the joint development concept to a "zone to be defined". 
The problem is how to define the "zone" for the joint development or joint 
cooperation. 
Sooner or later, agreement on the following four points will be required: 152 
a) The zone within which cooperative or joint activities is to take place; 
b) The nature or topics that will be the subject of the agreement ( e.g. fisheries, 
minerals, gas, oil, environment, marine scientific research, marine parks, etc.); 
150 Statement of the Ninth "Wokshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China 
Sea" (Jakarta, Indonesia, 1-3 December 1998). 
151 Statement Of the Second Meeting Of"The Study Group On Zones Of Co-Operation In The 
South China Sea" (Tabanan- Bali, Indonesia, 27 June- I July 1999). 
152 Statement Of the Second Meeting, Above. 
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c) The mechanism for joint development, which could be an Authority or a loose 
coordinating organization or arrangement; and 
d) Countries that shall participate in Joint Development or Joint Cooperation 
activities. 
Agreement on these four points would be the sine qua non for senous 
consideration of the possible role of joint development arrangements in the South 
China Sea. Following the First Meeting of the TWG on Resource Assessment, Dr. 
Djalal suggested a possible "zone". All claimants could cooperate on the basis of 
the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982. 
According to the Convention on the Law of the Sea, co-operation 1s 
enjoined on all coastal states, especially those that are littorals of an enclosed or 
semi-enclosed sea. 153 Article 123 (d) of the Convention states that "States 
bordering on enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should co-operate with each other in 
the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties. (And) to this 
end, they shall endeavour to invite, as appropriate, other interested states or 
international organizations to co- operate with them ... " The workshop debate was 
on the question, whether or not the South China Sea constitutes an 'enclosed or 
semi-enclosed sea" within the meaning of this Article. 154 Much of the debate on 
these issues has been highly politicised, some countries wish to answer in the 
negative to escape the obligations. Others produce highly legalistic textual 
analyses in support of one contention or the other. 
Surely, this Article attempts to put in legal language a concept, which 
derives from single ecosystem management, and hence the requirement to co-
operate is functionally driven. The lego-political element arises from the natural 
state off the body of water in question, not the other way around. The participants 
agreed that, this workshop is not the place for a major analysis of Article 123, but 
to raise the issue and to illustrate the problem. At the end, the participants agreed, 
that the Workshop process and other initiatives focusing in policy, management, 
153 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
154 Statement of the Ninth, Above. 
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and law must assist the authorities of the region to come to a better understanding 
of the relationship between the norms of the law of the sea and the human 
security/food security imperatives in confronting the challenge of ocean 
management in the South China Sea. 155 
155 Statement of the Ninth, Above. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Track two diplomatic initiatives in the South China Sea come into 
situations where more formal avenues for discussion are destined to fail or even 
get started. The South China Sea where a long history of confrontation between 
the claimants with the sensitive nature of South China Sea issues precluded 
official discussions on the subject. Based on the negative prospects of convening a 
successful intergovernmental meeting, the South China Sea workshops were 
designed to bring together academics and government personnel in their private 
capacities. This Managing Potential Conflicts is the creation of Ambassador 
Hasjim Djalal, who envisioned a "two pronged" approach to the territorial and 
jurisdictional dispute. They are, to focus on areas where cooperation involving all 
the littoral states of the South China Sea could be developed and secondly, to seek 
ways to prevent tensions in the region developing into armed conflicts and to 
encourage confidence building measures that would contribute to the creation of 
an atmosphere conducive to the possible resolution of the conflict. 
Links between governments and a clear identification of the issues become 
possible in a non-binding track two process. Rather that engages in the pointless 
posturing and fruitless debate over the justice of claims, which would occur in 
formal surroundings. These initiatives, such as the South China Sea workshops 
allow an entree into the "real" issues. These issues are management of living and 
non-living resources, navigation and environmental protection and others. Taken 
as a whole, the challenge of integrating these separate yet intimately linked 
components may be considered as the objective of an effective ocean management 
scheme. 
The South China Sea is a reg10n with a long-standing history of 
antagonism between states. It is an extremely challenging arena to attempt and to 
fully develop the complicated mixture of rights and obligations in ocean 
management. The Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China sea is one 
forum, which tries to develop an atmosphere of cooperation, whereby states 
acknowledge that they have not only rights when it comes to exploiting the wealth 
of the South China Sea but also obligations. 
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Recommendations 
1. Enhancing Dialogue and Mutual Understanding in the South China Sea. 
Larger countries should be mindful of the views of their neighbours and take 
steps to ensure that they are not perceived to be domineering or bullying their 
smaller neighbours. Realization by the claimants to the disputes that the outbreak 
of armed conflict will not settle any disputes, nor will it bring benefits to either 
parties, and is in fact inimical to the interests of all. The claimants must develop 
the political will to settle their disputes peacefully and to take measures to prevent 
conflict and to focus on their responsibilities with respect to the South China Sea. 
It is necessary to broaden participation m cooperative programs and to 
mcrease the areas of cooperation in a way, which is linked to economic 
development. If the benefits are seen to be mutual, the chance of success is all the 
greater. The approach should be inclusive rather than exclusive. The claimants 
should refrain from legislative acts and unhelpful or provocative acts, and should 
try to shift public opinion from support for a "hard line" to a more accommodating 
stance based on the need for co-operation e.g. through some form of joint 
development. 
2. Enhancing Transparency in the South China Sea. 
There is a need to increase "transparency" in national policy, legislation and 
documentation and to facilitate more frequent meetings between the legal officers 
of the various regional countries in order to exchange their documentation and 
information as well as their legislative planning. 
Preventive diplomacy requires patience, tenacity and consistent efforts. There 
is still a lot to be done to increase "transparency". All parties who have an interest 
in the solution of the problems, either regionally or internationally should 
undertake preventive diplomacy. For instance, Regular military to military 
cooperation should be established in the area of search and rescue and Informal 
dialogue should be promoted among military representatives on standard 
operating procedures and rules of engagement, unifonn international standards for 
vessel and aircraft transiting the region should be established, or promoting joint 
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accessed to commercially available satellite and other remote sensmg data 
showing what happening on disputed featured. 
3. Minimizing Conflict and Promoting Conflict Resolution in the South 
China Sea. 
Countries in the region should continue to develop various fora for dialogue, 
either bilateral or multilateral, either formal or informal. The various fora for 
dialogue should hopefully in the end be able to produce a set of agreed code of 
conduct for the region. Countries should pursue various avenues of peaceful 
settlement of disputes. Successful efforts often begin by informal efforts, either 
through track-two process or through informal track- one process. Only after those 
efforts indicate some possible success, a more formal approach of track-one could 
be attempted. This was the case with Cambodian (which started with informal 
cocktail parties), the Southern Philippines and the South China Sea Workshops. 
Third party mechanisms for disputes settlement should also be explored and 
utilized, such as good offices, mediation, arbitration, and even if necessary 
adjudication through the International Court of Justice or the Law of the Sea 
Tribunal. Drawing from the ASEAN Treaty on Amity and Co-operation, ASEAN 
had already formulated certain mechanism for dispute settlement among member 
countries, a new mechanism for the Asia Pacific region as a whole should also be 
considered. 
The countries in the South China Sea should do everything possible to settle 
their land, maritime and jurisdictional boundaries as soon as possible and respect 
the agreed boundaries, the principles of International Law, particularly to the Law 
of the Sea Convention 1982 and their willingness to submit to adjudication if 
negotiations between the parties concerned do not bring solution within 
reasonable time. The various models of joint development should also be 
considered as interim measures adopted pending delimitation. Track Two 
processes should be inventive and imaginative in considering approaches to 
jurisdictional issues, which might be adopted by Track One. 
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